Faulty IT System Spreads Misery in UK’s Postal Service


 

Suppose you enjoy a secure government job at which you work
diligently, and you have advanced to the managerial position of a sub-postmaster
in Post Office Ltd, the quasi-public organization that provides postal services
in most of the UK.  Then your
organization installs a new computerized system called Horizon that promises to
eliminate a lot of paperwork accounting and make things easier for
everybody.  But soon after it is
installed, you find that your accounts are not matching up with what the computer
says they are.  You bring these
discrepancies to the attention of your supervisors, but instead of looking into
the problem, they accuse you of stealing the deficit funds, amounting to many
thousands of pounds in some cases.

 

Something like this happened to dozens of UK sub-postmasters
over the last two decades.  Every time the
computer indicated an unexplained deficit, the Post Office concluded that the sub-postmasters
were responsible, and threatened many of them with prison terms if they didn’t
make up the deficit personally.  Some
did, mortgaging their houses and even going bankrupt, but others went to jail
anyway.  The accusations of theft led to psychological
problems, broken marriages, and at least one reported suicide.

 

Meanwhile, the Post Office authorized an outside agency
called Second Sight to conduct an independent investigation after it failed on
its own to find out what was really going on. 
One day before Second Sight was to publish its report in 2015, the Post Office
canceled the investigation, ordered the agency to destroy its files, and issued
a public statement denying that there were any systemic problems. 

 

Things went on like this until December of 2019, when the
Post Office began to admit publicly that it was wrong in many of the
cases.  And in March, the UK’s Court of
Appeals quashed 39 convictions involving Horizon errors.  This scandal, which has been called the largest
miscarriage of justice in the UK for many decades, will have legal
repercussions for years.  But now that
things are starting to be remedied, how did they get so bad in the first place?

 

I once knew a woman who had worked her way up to being
postmaster of a small New England town. 
She enjoyed her job until one day when about $20,000 of stamps turned up
missing.  To this day I believe she was
not guilty of stealing the stamps, but the U. S. Postal Service held her
personally responsible for the loss, and when we left New England for Texas
around the time Horizon was being installed in 2000, she was still paying off
that debt. 

 

I’m not sure what it is about postal-service managers that
makes them jump to the conclusion that any financial discrepancy is
automatically the fault of the local person in charge, but that’s certainly
what happened in the case of the Horizon system.  The 2015 investigation report, which was
eventually obtained by news organizations, said that Horizon’s communications
links were so bad that an average of 12,000 communication failures happened
every year.  Horizon was developed by
Fujitsu in the late 1990s mainly as a way to automate welfare benefit payments,
which were then handled through the quasi-governmental Post Office
branches.  The government’s Benefits
Agency then pulled out, leaving Fujitsu to finish the job on its own. 

 

If one reads between the lines of the reports on this
scandal, it seems that the errors happened like this:  A transaction involving cash takes place at a
remote location, but there is a communications glitch between the remote
station and the central accounting office. 
Money goes out from the remote kiosk but doesn’t get reported to the
main system.  Evidently, the system was
not designed to do checks or other actions that would identify such dropouts
and correct them.  When the physical cash
was counted at the end of the reporting period, naturally it came up
short.  Despite the fact that the
sub-postmaster in charge might know that the machine was giving out cash but
not reporting it to headquarters, his bosses believed the machine, not him, and
accused him of theft. 

 

Multiply this scenario by a few dozen cases a year, and you
have a real nightmare.  Fortunately, the
nightmare is drawing to a close, but there is no way to recover the reputations
and well-being of those who lost both when they were falsely accused of stealing. 

 

Synergism can be good or bad, and in this case it was
terrible.  You had a badly designed
hardware and software system that was prone to errors, to begin with.  And then it was installed by managers whose
ignorance of technology led them to view computers as a sort of oracle of
God:  the machine can’t be wrong, so it
must be those pesky humans that are stealing the money in devious ways we can’t
detect.  And what is worse, once the
management had taken that position, the longer time went on the harder it would
be to admit they were wrong, and maybe all these prosecutions were a mistake
after all.  So, unwisely but
understandably, the managers dug in their heels, even going to the extent of
quashing the report that revealed they were wrong.

 

The people responsible for this fiasco may or may not pay a
penalty for their coverups and denials. 
Groups of present and former sub-postmasters are continuing to seek
legal redress for their unjust convictions, and this may involve civil lawsuits
that would penalize the managers who made bad decisions. 

 

But regardless of what happens in the future, engineers
everywhere can take this scandal as a bad example of how not to do an IT
system.  It is a remarkable thing that,
at least in the U. S., there have been relatively few instances of internal
failures in the money-machine networks run by banks, as opposed to attacks by
outsiders.  Commercial banks, being historically
conservative institutions, apparently insisted from the outset on multiple
checks and extreme robustness in their money-handling networks, so that even in
the face of communications interruptions and power failures, they always know
how much money they have and can keep track of it without loss. 

 

Fortunately, the UK Post Office has announced that they are
replacing Horizon with a cloud-based system that should work much better.  For the sake of its customers and especially
for the well-being of its sub-postmasters, let’s hope they’re right.

 

Sources:  I referred to
articles on the scandal in The Verge at https://www.theverge.com/2021/4/23/22399721/uk-post-office-software-bug-criminal-convictions-overturned,
from the BBC at https://www.bbc.com/news/business-56718036, and the Wikipedia
article on Horizon (IT system).  I thank
Michael Cook of Mercatornet.com for bringing this scandal to my attention.

 



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