- When: a cold San Francisco summer afternoon
- Where: Room 305, Cloudflare
- Who: 2 from Cloudflare + 9 from the Tor Project
What could go wrong?
Bit of Background
Two years ago this week Cloudflare introduced Opportunistic Encryption, a feature that provided additional security and performance benefits to websites that had not yet moved to HTTPS. Indeed, back in the old days some websites only used HTTP — weird, right? “Opportunistic” here meant that the server advertised support for HTTP/2 via an HTTP Alternative Service header in the hopes that any browser that recognized the protocol could take advantage of those benefits in subsequent requests to that domain.
Around the same time, CEO Matthew Prince wrote about the importance and challenges of privacy on the Internet and tasked us to find a solution that provides convenience, security, and anonymity.
From neutralizing fingerprinting vectors and everyday browser trackers that Privacy Badger feeds on, all the way to mitigating correlation attacks that only big actors are capable of, guaranteeing privacy is a complicated challenge. Fortunately, the Tor Project addresses this extensive adversary model in Tor Browser.
However, the Internet is full of bad actors, and distinguishing legitimate traffic from malicious traffic, which is one of Cloudflare’s core features, becomes much more difficult when the traffic is anonymous. In particular, many features that make Tor a great tool for privacy also make it a tool for hiding the source of malicious traffic. That is why many resort to using CAPTCHA challenges to make it more expensive to be a bot on the Tor network. There is, however, a collateral damage associated with using CAPTCHA challenges to stop bots: humans eyes also have to deal with them.
One way to minimize this is using privacy-preserving cryptographic signatures, aka blinded tokens, such as those that power Privacy Pass.
The other way is to use onions.
Here Come the Onions
Today’s edition of the Crypto Week introduces an “opportunistic” solution to this problem, so that under suitable conditions, anyone using Tor Browser 8.0 will benefit from improved security and performance when visiting Cloudflare websites without having to face a CAPTCHA. At the same time, this feature enables more fine-grained rate-limiting to prevent malicious traffic, and since the mechanics of the idea described here are not specific to Cloudflare, anyone can reuse this method on their own website.
As Matthew mentioned in his blog post, one way to sift through Tor traffic is to use the onion service protocol. Onion services are Tor nodes that advertise their public key, encoded as an address with .onion TLD, and use “rendezvous points” to establish connections entirely within the Tor network:
While onion services are designed to provide anonymity for content providers, media organizations use them to allow whistleblowers to communicate securely with them and Facebook uses one to tell Tor users from bots.
The technical reason why this works is that from an onion service’s point of view each individual Tor connection, or circuit, has a unique but ephemeral number associated to it, while from a normal server’s point of view all Tor requests made via one exit node share the same IP address. Using this circuit number, onion services can distinguish individual circuits and terminate those that seem to behave maliciously. To clarify, this does not mean that onion services can identify or track Tor users.
While bad actors can still establish a fresh circuit by repeating the rendezvous protocol, doing so involves a cryptographic key exchange that costs time and computation. Think of this like a cryptographic dial-up sequence. Spammers can dial our onion service over and over, but every time they have to repeat the key exchange.
Alternatively, finishing the rendezvous protocol can be thought of as a small proof of work required in order to use the Cloudflare Onion Service. This increases the cost of using our onion service for performing denial of service attacks.
Problem solved, right?
Not quite. As discussed when we introduced the hidden resolver, the problem of ensuring that a seemingly random .onion address is correct is a barrier to usable security. In that case, our solution was to purchase an Extended Validation (EV) certificate, which costs considerably more. Needless to say, this limits who can buy an HTTPS certificate for their onion service to a privileged few.
Some people disagree. In particular, the new generation of onion services resolves the weakness that Matthew pointed to as a possible reason why the CA/B Forum only permits EV certificates for onion services. This could mean that getting Domain Validation (DV) certificates for onion services could be possible soon. We certainly hope that’s the case.
Still, DV certificates lack the organization name (e.g. “Cloudflare, Inc.”) that appears in the address bar, and cryptographically relevant numbers are nearly impossible to remember or distinguish for humans. This brings us back to the problem of usable security, so we came up with a different idea.
Looking at onion addresses differently
Forget for a moment that we’re discussing anonymity. When you type “cloudflare.com” in a browser and press enter, your device first resolves that domain name into an IP address, then your browser asks the server for a certificate valid for “cloudflare.com” and attempts to establish an encrypted connection with the host. As long as the certificate is trusted by a certificate authority, there’s no reason to mind the IP address.
Roughly speaking, the idea here is to simply switch the IP address in the scenario above with an .onion address. As long as the certificate is valid, the .onion address itself need not be manually entered by a user or even be memorable. Indeed, the fact that the certificate was valid indicates that the .onion address was correct.
In particular, in the same way that a single IP address can serve millions of domains, a single .onion address should be able to serve any number of domains.
Except, DNS doesn’t work this way.
How does it work then?
Just as with Opportunistic Encryption, we can point users to the Cloudflare Onion Service using HTTP Alternative Services, a mechanism that allows servers to tell clients that the service they are accessing is available at another network location or over another protocol. For instance, when Tor Browser makes a request to “cloudflare.com,” Cloudflare adds an Alternative Service header to indicate that the site is available to access over HTTP/2 via our onion services.
In the same sense that Cloudflare owns the IP addresses that serve our customers’ websites, we run 10 .onion addresses. Think of them as 10 Cloudflare points of presence (or PoPs) within the Tor network. The exact header looks something like this, except with all 10 .onion addresses included, each starting with the prefix “cflare”:
alt-svc: h2="cflare2nge4h4yqr3574crrd7k66lil3torzbisz6uciyuzqc2h2ykyd.onion:443"; ma=86400; persist=1
This simply indicates that the “cloudflare.com” can be authoritatively accessed using HTTP/2 (“h2”) via the onion service “cflare2n[…].onion”, over virtual port 443. The field “ma” (max-age) indicates how long in seconds the client should remember the existence of the alternative service and “persist” indicates whether alternative service cache should be cleared when the network is interrupted.
Once the browser receives this header, it attempts to make a new Tor circuit to the onion service advertised in the alt-svc header and confirm that the server listening on virtual port 443 can present a valid certificate for “cloudflare.com” — that is, the original hostname, not the .onion address.
The onion service then relays the Client Hello packet to a local server which can serve a certificate for “cloudflare.com.” This way the Tor daemon itself can be very minimal. Here is a sample configuration file:
SocksPort 0 HiddenServiceNonAnonymousMode 1 HiddenServiceSingleHopMode 1 HiddenServiceVersion 3 HiddenServicePort 443 SafeLogging 1 Log notice stdout
Be careful with using the configuration above, as it enables a non-anonymous setting for onion services that do not require anonymity for themselves. To clarify, this does not sacrifice privacy or anonymity of Tor users, just the server. Plus, it improves latency of the circuits.
If the certificate is signed by a trusted certificate authority, for any subsequent requests to “cloudflare.com” the browser will connect using HTTP/2 via the onion service, sidestepping the need for going through an exit node.
Here are the steps summarized one more time:
- A new Tor circuit is established;
- The browser sends a Client Hello to the onion service with SNI=cloudflare.com;
- The onion service relays the packet to a local server;
- The server replies with Server Hello for SNI=cloudflare.com;
- The onion service relays the packet to the browser;
- The browser verifies that the certificate is valid.
To reiterate, the certificate presented by the onion service only needs to be valid for the original hostname, meaning that the onion address need not be mentioned anywhere on the certificate. This is a huge benefit, because it allows you to, for instance, present a free Let’s Encrypt certificate for your .org domain rather than an expensive EV certificate.
Distinguishing the Circuits
Remember that while one exit node can serve many many different clients, from Cloudflare’s point of view all of that traffic comes from one IP address. This pooling helps cover the malicious traffic among legitimate traffic, but isn’t essential in the security or privacy of Tor. In fact, it can potentially hurt users by exposing their traffic to bad exit nodes.
Remember that Tor circuits to onion services carry a circuit number which we can use to rate-limit the circuit. Now, the question is how to inform a server such as nginx of this number with minimal effort. As it turns out, with only a small tweak in the Tor binary, we can insert a Proxy Protocol header in the beginning of each packet that is forwarded to the server. This protocol is designed to help TCP proxies pass on parameters that can be lost in translation, such as source and destination IP addresses, and is already supported by nginx, Apache, Caddy, etc.
Luckily for us, the IPv6 space is so vast that we can encode the Tor circuit number as an IP address in an unused range and use the Proxy Protocol to send it to the server. Here is an example of the header that our Tor daemon would insert in the connection:
PROXY TCP6 2405:8100:8000:6366:1234:ABCD ::1 43981 443rn
In this case, 0x1234ABCD encodes the circuit number in the last 32 bits of the source IP address. The local Cloudflare server can then transparently use that IP to assign reputation, show CAPTCHAs, or block requests when needed.
Note that even though requests relayed by an onion service don’t carry an IP address, you will see an IP address like the one above with country code “T1” in your logs. This IP only specifies the circuit number seen by the onion service, not the actual user IP address. In fact, 2405:8100:8000::/48 is an unused subnet allocated to Cloudflare that we are not routing globally for this purpose.
This enables customers to continue detecting bots using IP reputation while sparing humans the trouble of clicking on CAPTCHA street signs over and over again.
Why should I trust Cloudflare?
You don’t need to. The Cloudflare Onion Service presents the exact same certificate that we would have used for direct requests to our servers, so you could audit this service using Certificate Transparency (which includes Nimbus, our certificate transparency log), to reveal any potential cheating.
Additionally, since Tor Browser 8.0 makes a new circuit for each hostname when connecting via an .onion alternative service, the circuit number cannot be used to link connections to two different sites together.
Note that all of this works without running any entry, relay, or exit nodes. Therefore the only requests that we see as a result of this feature are the requests that were headed for us anyway. In particular, since no new traffic is introduced, Cloudflare does not gain any more information about what people do on the internet.
Is it faster?
Tor isn’t known for being fast. One reason for that is the physical cost of having packets bounce around in a decentralized network. Connections made through the Cloudflare Onion Service don’t add to this cost because the number of hops is no more than usual.
Another reason is the bandwidth costs of exit node operators. This is an area that we hope this service can offer relief since it shifts traffic from exit nodes to our own servers, reducing exit node operation costs along with it.
BONUS: Performance, ✓
How do I enable it?
Onion Routing is now available to all Cloudflare customers, enabled by default for Free and Pro plans. The option is available in the Crypto tab of the Cloudflare dashboard.
We recommend using Tor Browser 8.0, which is the first stable release based on Firefox 60 ESR, and supports .onion Alt-Svc headers as well as HTTP/2. The new Tor Browser for Android (alpha) also supports this feature. You can check whether your connection is routed through an onion service or not in the Developer Tools window under the Network tab. If you’re using the Tor Browser and you don’t see the Alt-Svc in the response headers, that means you’re already using the .onion route. In future versions of Tor Browser you’ll be able to see this in the UI.
There is also interest from other privacy-conscious browser vendors. Tom Lowenthal, Product Manager for Privacy & Security at Brave said:
Automatic upgrades to `.onion` sites will provide another layer of safety to Brave’s Private Browsing with Tor. We’re excited to implement this emerging standard.
Any last words?
Similar to Opportunistic Encryption, Opportunistic Onions do not fully protect against attackers who can simply remove the alternative service header. Therefore it is important to use HTTPS Everywhere to secure the first request. Once a Tor circuit is established, subsequent requests should stay in the Tor network from source to destination.
As we maintain and improve this service we will share what we learn. In the meanwhile, feel free to try out this idea on Caddy and reach out to us with any comments or suggestions that you might have.
Patrick McManus of Mozilla for enabling support for .onion alternative services in Firefox; Arthur Edelstein of the Tor Project for reviewing and enabling HTTP/2 and HTTP Alternative Services in Tor Browser 8.0; Alexander Færøy and George Kadianakis of the Tor Project for adding support for Proxy Protocol in onion services; the entire Tor Project team for their invaluable assistance and discussions; and last, but not least, many folks at Cloudflare who helped with this project.
Addresses used by the Cloudflare Onion Service
cflarexljc3rw355ysrkrzwapozws6nre6xsy3n4yrj7taye3uiby3ad.onion cflarenuttlfuyn7imozr4atzvfbiw3ezgbdjdldmdx7srterayaozid.onion cflares35lvdlczhy3r6qbza5jjxbcplzvdveabhf7bsp7y4nzmn67yd.onion cflareusni3s7vwhq2f7gc4opsik7aa4t2ajedhzr42ez6uajaywh3qd.onion cflareki4v3lh674hq55k3n7xd4ibkwx3pnw67rr3gkpsonjmxbktxyd.onion cflarejlah424meosswvaeqzb54rtdetr4xva6mq2bm2hfcx5isaglid.onion cflaresuje2rb7w2u3w43pn4luxdi6o7oatv6r2zrfb5xvsugj35d2qd.onion cflareer7qekzp3zeyqvcfktxfrmncse4ilc7trbf6bp6yzdabxuload.onion cflareub6dtu7nvs3kqmoigcjdwap2azrkx5zohb2yk7gqjkwoyotwqd.onion cflare2nge4h4yqr3574crrd7k66lil3torzbisz6uciyuzqc2h2ykyd.onion
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